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INTRODUCTION
Character evidence has long been a subject of hearty debate. How a
person has behaved in the past, and others' opinions about that person,
are bits of information we use to make everyday decisions. When inter-
viewing a job applicant for a law firm, for instance, would you want to
know whether the applicant has committed sexual harassment while in a
previous job? When checking references, would you want to find out
whether the applicant is a team player and gets along with co-workers?
Of course you would. We all want this information to help us decide
whether to offer the applicant a position at our firm.
It is common sense to seek information about a person's past
behavior and about others' impressions of a person about whom we are
trying to make a decision. Jurors in criminal cases feel the same way.
When they are faced with whether to find someone guilty or not guilty,
and the case is a close one, common sense tells them to consider the
defendant's prior behavior, and the opinions and impressions of those
who know the defendant outside of court.
Despite our common-sense desire to use character evidence to
decide whether to trust or believe someone, the English Common Law
and the codification of evidence law into United Kingdom and United
States statutes long sought to protect us from ourselves by prohibiting
jurors from hearing character evidence to prove conduct in conformity
with that character.' Legislators recognize that while past conduct and
impressions are useful information for decision-makers, presenting the
evidence can be unfair to those on trial because the jurors may convict a
person based on his past behavior, rather than on his current conduct.
For this reason, the rules of evidence in many jurisdictions prevent
1. See ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 467 (7th ed. 2008) (noting that "bad
character evidence of the accused was admissible only exceptionally."). See also 1 McCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE 281 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (explaining that the Federal Rules of
Evidence "basically codify common law doctrine.").
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jurors from using this information to help them decide the crucial issue
of guilt or innocence.
In criminal cases, the prosecution generally is not allowed to pre-
sent character evidence about a criminal defendant in order to prove that
the defendant acted in conformity with that character trait during a par-
ticular situation. Over the centuries, there has been some movement
away from a strict application of the general character evidence ban. For
instance, the ban has been applied less strictly on issues of witness credi-
bility, and, more recently in the United States, for those charged with
sexual assaults and child molestations.2 In 2003, the United Kingdom
took the bold step of abolishing the common law rules on bad character
evidence and started anew with sections 98 through 111 of the 2003
Criminal Justice Act.3 The 2003 CJA makes the 180-degree shift from a
general exclusion of character evidence to prove propensity to a more
inclusionary alternative-one that provides numerous paths for admit-
ting bad character evidence. These paths are called "gateways,"' and the
gateways are quite wide.
The gateways provide prosecutors the opportunity to offer bad
character evidence about the defendant in criminal trials and permit
broad latitude in the jurors' consideration of bad character evidence.
Under the 2003 CJA, character evidence that is admissible for one pur-
pose can be used for other purposes, and a defendant's character can be
attacked for credibility purposes regardless of whether he testifies at
trial. In addition, pretrial disclosures made during pre- or post-arrest
questioning can open the door to bad character evidence at trial, and
specific instance character evidence is more broadly available.
Has the United Kingdom gone too far? Or has the United States not
gone far enough? Would the criminal justice system be better served by
a more relaxed approach to the admissibility of bad character evidence?
Or would the rights of the accused be more severely prejudiced if char-
acter evidence was more widely used for propensity purposes? In short,
what lessons can be learned from the expansive approach of our brothers
and sisters in law across the pond as they apply the 2003 CJA?
This article begins with a brief historical primer on the character
evidence rules that apply to criminal defendants in the United States and
the United Kingdom. Part One summarizes the evolution of the rules
limiting the use of bad character evidence about criminal defendants at
trial. Part Two of this article explains the specific requirements of each
gateway of the 2003 CJA and uses recent case authorities to illustrate the
2. See FED. R. EVID. 608, 413, 414.
3. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 98-111 (Eng.).
4. See Criminal Justice Act § 101.
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application of each gateway. Next, Part Three compares and contrasts
the admissibility of character evidence through each gateway with its
admissibility under the corresponding Federal Rule(s) of Evidence. Part
Four analyzes and evaluates four major distinctions between the 2003
CJA in the United Kingdom and the FRE in the United States and makes
recommendations for reform.
I. PART ONE: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULE
AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS
This section provides a general overview of the character evidence
rules pertinent to this article for those readers familiar with the FRE. It
provides some detail on the background of the United Kingdom charac-
ter evidence law and then quickly traces how those rules have evolved
over the centuries.
The long-standing general rule is that character evidence is not
admissible to prove that a person behaved in conformity with that char-
acter trait on a particular occasion.6 Character evidence is evidence
about the person's past conduct and not the conduct at issue in the cur-
rent litigation. The three basic types of character evidence are specific
instance, opinion, and reputation,' which are illustrated in the
paragraphs below using the job applicant example in the Introduction
above.
Assume that the interviewer offered the applicant a job, and then
months later, that new employee was accused of sexual harassment.
There are no witnesses to the alleged harassment, so the case involves a
typical "she said, he said" situation. When the harassment victim sues
the employee and the company, he would like to call as witnesses other
co-workers from the defendant's previous employers to provide evi-
dence that this employee is the type of person who sexually harasses co-
workers. The argument is a propensity argument, stating that because the
employee has harassed co-workers in the past, she is the kind of person
who harasses co-workers; therefore, she likely harassed this co-worker
in her current job. This is an illustration of specific instance character
evidence.
Opinion testimony is another form of character evidence. In the
example above, a witness who is familiar with the employee testifies
5. For a more detailed review of the complicated character evidence rules under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1. For more information on the
United Kingdom law prior to the 2003 CJA, see KEANE, supra note 1, at 448-58.
6. There are exceptions to this general rule, and those pertinent to this article's analysis will
be discussed infra notes 18-21, 153-57, 172-73, and accompanying text.
7. FED. R. EvID. 405.
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about her opinion of the employee's gender sensitivity (e.g., "In my
opinion, she is too friendly with co-workers and makes inappropriate
sexual suggestions in the workplace."). That testimony is in the form of
an opinion on the character of the defendant in the case.
Similarly, character evidence can take the form of reputation testi-
mony, which is basically an amalgamation of multiple opinions. When a
witness testifies, "I used to work with the defendant at my previous job,
and for the entire time that I have known her, her reputation has been
that she sexually harasses male co-workers. All the men warn each other
not to get in a situation to be alone with her," she is offering character
evidence of the reputational variety.
All three types of character evidence were generally inadmissible at
trial unless an exception applied.' Focusing on the character of criminal
defendants, the United Kingdom law generally excluded evidence of the
bad character of a criminal defendant at trial.' Even evidence of prior
convictions and prior bad acts can be excluded on the grounds that the
evidence is unduly prejudicial."o There were two primary exceptions to
this general rule of exclusion: (1) where the accused brought up his own
character; and (2) where similar fact evidence was sufficiently probative
to outweigh the prejudicial impact."
A. Relaxing the Rule
As the doctrine developed in the United Kingdom, the accused
maintained a "shield" against cross-examination of his bad character.
The prosecution could penetrate that shield only in three situations: (1)
where the defendant "asserted his good character"; (2) where "the nature
and conduct of the defence was such as to involve imputations on the
character of witnesses for the prosecution or the deceased victim of a
crime"; or (3) where "the accused gave evidence against" a co-defendant
charged in the same proceeding.' 2 If the accused did not offer evidence
of his own good character, nor challenge the character of a witness, vic-
tim or co-defendant, then the door to bad character evidence remained
tightly shut. Where the defendant testified on his own behalf, his credi-
bility became an issue. The long-standing rule, however, prevented
8. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 405.
9. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 455 (stating that "[t]he general rule was exclusionary. The
prosecution were not permitted either to adduce evidence of the accused's bad character, other
than that relating directly to the offence charged, or to cross-examine witnesses for the defence
with a view to eliciting such evidence.").
10. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (requiring balancing probative value against prejudice). See also
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
I1. KEANE, supra note 1, at 456.
12. Id.
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many challenges to that credibility, because they were considered to be
unduly prejudicial.'
As one would expect, the character evidence rules across the Atlan-
tic Ocean paralleled those of the United Kingdom.14 Under the common
law, the general rule provided that character evidence was not admissi-
ble to prove conduct in conformity on a particular occasion." That rule
was codified into the FRE.' 6 In addressing the character trait of credibil-
ity, where a person sought to be a witness at trial, certain convictions
could be used for impeaching the credibility of the witness after the
witness had given his testimony."
The modem rule in the United States has an exception to the gen-
eral character evidence ban that permits the use of felony convictions
(subject to a probative value-prejudicial effect balancing test) to
impeach any witness, including when the criminal defendant testifies on
his own behalf at trial.'s The balancing test has been relaxed where the
convictions are for crimes involving false statement or dishonesty (1990
Amendments) or where either is necessary to establish an element of the
crime (2006 Amendments).' 9 In addition, another exception notes that
reputation and opinion evidence about the defendant's character for
untruthfulness is admissible if the defendant testifies.2 0 On cross-exami-
nation, the prosecution may inquire about specific instances for the pur-
poses of impeaching the defendant's character for truthfulness, but those
specific instances may not be proven extrinsically.2 1
Like the laws of the United Kingdom, the FRE permit evidence of
prior bad acts when used to prove something other than conduct in con-
formity.2 2 Those non-conduct in conformity purposes include motive,
identity, common plan, preparation, and absence of mistake or
accident.23
13. See id. at 455 ("The rule prevented the prosecution from introductory evidence of
previous convictions, previous misconduct, and disposition towards wrongdoing or misconduct,
the principle rationale of the rule being that the prejudice created by such evidence outweighed
any probative value it might have.").
14. See David Culberg, Note, The Accused's Bad Character: Theory and Practice, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2009).
15. Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence:
A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 556, 559-60 (1984).
16. See FED. R. EVID. 404. See also McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 281.
17. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 62-63.
18. FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
19. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) advisory committee's notes.
20. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
21. FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
22. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
23. Id. This also includes intent, opportunity, and knowledge on its non-exhaustive list of
non-character purposes. Id. Some would argue that these are backdoor ways to admit character
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B. Obviating the Rule in Certain Types of Federal Cases
While the general prohibition against the use of character evidence
remains in force in the United States, in the mid-1990s three relatively
new additions to the FRE broadened the admissibility of certain kinds of
character evidence in specific types of cases. In 1995, Congress modi-
fied the FRE in sexual assault and child molestation cases to address
public policy concerns over the recidivism rates of those charged with
such offenses.24
This modification for sexual assault and child molestation cases
consists of several rules2 5 that overturn the general prohibition against
the use of character evidence to prove conduct in conformity on a partic-
ular occasion. FRE 413 provides that in sexual assault trials, evidence of
the defendant's prior acts of sexual assault can be used "for its bearing
on any matter to which it is relevant." 26 FRE 414 similarly overturns the
character evidence ban in cases charging child molestation. 27 In addi-
tion, FRE 415 applies the terms of FRE 413 and FRE 414 to civil cases
alleging sexual assault or child molestation.28
Thus, in federal criminal prosecutions where the accused is charged
with a sexual assault or a child molestation offense, the general prohibi-
tion against using character evidence to prove conduct in conformity
evaporates. Specific instances of past sexual assaults or child molesta-
tions are admissible to help prove that the defendant committed the cur-
rently charged sexual assault or child molestation. This substantial
departure from the common law character evidence rules was deemed
justified by social science research about recidivism among these types
of perpetrators.29
evidence for a conduct-in-conformity purpose, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this
article. For more information, see generally Chris Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our
Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule 404(b) Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2007).
24. See generally Michelle Harper Lawson, Note, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: A
Guide for Massachusetts Evidentiary Law, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1175 (2004) ("Studies also
estimate that '1 in 4 imprisoned rape and sexual assault offenders has a prior history of
convictions for violent crimes, and I in 7 has been previously convicted of a violent sex crime.' In
1994, in an attempt to reduce similar staggering statistics, Congress passed Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414 pursuant to the Violent Crime Control Act." (citations omitted)).
25. See DAVID W. MILLER & THOMAS J. LEACH, FEDERAL & CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE RULES
195 (2009) (explaining that FRE 413 through FRE 415 were part of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and went into effect in July 1995).
26. FED. R. EvID. 413(a).
27. FED. R. EVID. 414(a).
28. FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
29. See Lawson, supra note 24, at 1179 n.29.
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C. Reversing the Rule from Exclusion to Inclusion in
the United Kingdom
After some criticism of the narrowness of the character evidence
laws in the United Kingdom, there were discussions about modifying the
laws to ameliorate the strict prohibition on bad character evidence.3 0
Reformers suggested that the focus shift to provide more discretion to
the judge and jurors to consider what weight to give relevant bad charac-
ter evidence. 3 1 The result of the reform efforts was a substantial relaxa-
tion of the character evidence prohibitions-in fact, the United
Kingdom's response was to abolish the common law on bad character
evidence and create the gateways of the 2003 CJA.
The focus of the 2003 CJA is on inclusion, rather than exclusion, 3 2
that substantially expands the scope of bad character evidence admissi-
ble at trial.3 Adrian Keane, author of The Modern Law of Evidence,3 4
notes that the 2003 CJA provisions "allow evidence of the accused's bad
character to be admitted more readily than in the past."3 The 2003 CJA
was intended to expand the use and admissibility of bad character evi-
dence in criminal trials.3 6 Once admitted, the bad character evidence is
more broadly available to prove relevant matters in the case.
Instead of the former barricade to character evidence, with only a
few breach points, the 2003 CJA provides an open field with many paths
and few obstacles to offering bad character evidence. These paths are in
the form of seven "gateways" through which bad character evidence
may be admitted under the 2003 CJA." If the evidence is admissible
through any one of the gateways, it may be used for other purposes as
well.
30. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 455.
31. Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
32. See id. at 467 ("The approach under section 101 of the 2003 [CJA] is radically different.
It is not one of inadmissibility subject to exceptions, but of admissibility if certain criteria are
met." (citing R v. Weir, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2866, [35], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1885 [1899] (Eng.)).
33. See id.
34. KEANE, supra note 1.
35. Id. at 467-68.
36. See R v. Edwards, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3244, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1524 [1526] (Eng.)
("Under the new regime, it is apparent that Parliament intended that evidence of bad character
would be put before juries more frequently than had hitherto been the case."). As was said in
Weir, "[Tihe 2003 Act completely reverses the pre-existing general rule. Evidence of bad
character is now admissible if it satisfies certain criteria (see section 101(1)), and the approach is
no longer one of inadmissibility subject to exceptions." Weir, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2866 at [35].
37. See Edwards, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3244 at [100]. The Edwards court also quotes the
trial judge's instruction to the jury that admitted bad character evidence can be used for a
credibility assessment, as well as in deciding whether the defendant committed the offenses. Id. at
[101].
38. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 101-106 (Eng.).
39. See infra Part II.
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The gateways are open when: (a) the parties mutually agree to
admissibility; (b) the defendant raises his own character evidence; (c)
the jury needs the information as important explanatory evidence; (d) an
important matter at issue between the prosecution and the defense is
involved; (e) the evidence has substantial probative value for an impor-
tant matter between co-defendants; (f) the evidence is necessary to cor-
rect a misimpression given by the defendant; or (g) the defendant has
attacked the character of another person.40
H1. PART Two: RULES GOVERNING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE BAD
CHARACTER OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS UNDER THE 2003 CJA
As noted in Part One, the 2003 CJA made substantial changes to
the character evidence rules in criminal cases. These changes mainly
apply to evidence of bad character. Good character evidence is still gov-
erned by the common law rules, as explicitly noted in the statute." The
common law rules permit evidence of good character in the form of
reputation, but prohibit the use of specific instances to prove good char-
acter.4 2 The judge provides a "good character direction" to the jury to
explain that the jury can use that good character evidence towards prov-
ing credibility if the accused testifies,4 3 as well as towards proving inno-
cence regardless of whether the accused testifies." The 2003 CJA
addresses the character of defendants and non-defendants in separate
sections; this article will focus on the criminal defendant's character.4 5
Bad character evidence now enjoys greater admissibility in the
United Kingdom. The categories of admissible bad character evidence
under the 2003 CJA include not only convictions, but also prior bad
acts, allegations, and even crimes for which the defendant was acquit-
40. Criminal Justice Act § 101(1).
41. See id. § 99(1).
42. See R v. Rowton, (1865) 169 Eng. Rep. 1497.
43. See R v. Shepherd, [1995] EWCA (Crim) 153 (Eng.). See also KEANE, supra note 1, at
454 n.38.
44. See R v. Alkaitis, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1072 (Eng.). In Alkaitis, the accused was charged
with importing drugs, and while she had no previous drug convictions, she had used drugs
recreationally in excess. Id. at [6]. The trial judge gave a modified good character direction
emphasizing the accused's past drug abuse, and the accused was convicted. Id. at [1], [8]. The
appellate judge, however, quashed the direction on the grounds that it was unduly prejudicial and
the conviction was unsafe. Id. at [21].
45. The character of non-defendants is addressed in section 100 of the CJA, while the
character of defendants is addressed in section 101. The common law is preserved for other
character issues not addressed by the CJA. Section 118(1)(2) reads, "Any rule of law under which
in criminal proceedings evidence of a person's reputation is admissible for the purpose of proving
his good or bad character." Criminal Justice Act § 118(1). The provision goes on to note that the
rule is preserved for the purpose of the evidence being used to prove the "matter concerned." Id.
88 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:79
ted.4 6 Evidence that a person drinks excessively or is a poor co-worker
could constitute bad character evidence and be admissible under these
rules.4 7 Under some gateways, however, judges retain the discretion to
limit the use of these sorts of character assertions to avoid wasting the
court's time and confusing the jury with a multitude of minor infractions
that do not bear directly on the charge at issue."
Each gateway of the 2003 CJA has its own requirements for admit-
ting bad character evidence; the sub-sections below discuss these
requirements.
46. See Mark George & Mary McKeone, Garden Ct. N. Barristers Chambers, Presentation on
"The Bad Character Provisions of the CJA 2003" for the Crime Team Spring Seminar Series 3
(May 22, 2005), transcript available at http://www.gcnchambers.co.uk/index.php/gcn/content/
download/1238/7945/file/CJA-Bad%20Character-MG-updated%20220905.pdf (updated Sept. 22,
2005). George & McKeone note that:
Evidence capable of coming within the definition of misconduct in [section] 112
includes previous allegations in respect of which the defendant has been tried and
acquitted, allegations which were never tried at all for one reason or another or other
complaints which never reached the police (e.g. a complaint by a pupil against a
teacher which was considered by the head teacher but never reported to the police)
.... Depending on the use to be made by the prosecution of the previous allegations
(about which more later) it would seem that such evidence would now be admissible
under [section] 101.).
Id. In particular situations, evidence of previous acquittals is admissible. See id. See also R v. Z,
[2000] 2 A.C. 483 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (reasoning that using evidence of the
occurrence of a criminal act, even where the accused was acquitted in a prosecution for that act,
does not violate double jeopardy because the evidence is being used to help prove the later crime,
not as an attempt to re-prove the former crime).
47. See George and McKeone, supra note 46, at 3. Parties are permitted to admit bad
character evidence that extends beyond prior acquittals and convictions. Id. The CJA provides:
The definition of misconduct in [section] 112 includes "other reprehensible
behaviour". How far this extends will no doubt be the subject of much litigation in
the next few months and years. Nevertheless it is possible to indicate the likely
parameters. It has been suggested by some academic commentators that "other
reprehensible behaviour" could encompass telling lies, drinking to excess, failing to
pay one's debts, disobedience, absenteeism and other serous misconduct at work,
promiscuity, cheating on a spouse or partner and any other conduct of which "right
thinking" people would disapprove. If this is right, then it would appear that the
scope for this sort of conduct being admitted in evidence is potentially very wide.
Id.
48. See George and McKeone, supra note 46, at 3. While the language in the CJA appears to
allow bad character evidence outside of previous convictions, it seems offensive to adduce
evidence of unproven accusations for the purpose of proving propensity to commit an offense. See
id. Despite the broad scope of the CJA's bad character provisions, which has been expanded upon
hypothetically by numerous academic commentators, many courts prefer to take a stricter
approach to admitting bad character evidence. See id. In R. v. Bovell, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1091,
[2005] Crim. App. 27 (Eng.), the court questioned the admissibility of an allegation that
eventually ended in a withdrawn criminal charge. See George & McKeone, supra note 46, at 2.
Bovell implies that the court of appeal will not tolerate the admittance of evidence that "amounts
to little more than idle gossip and tittle-tattle." See id. at 4.
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A. Gateway (a): Mutual Agreement
Under gateway (a), evidence of the defendant's bad character is
admissible by mutual agreement. 49 If the parties agree that certain evi-
dence of the defendant's bad character should be used at trial, then that
bad character evidence will be admissible. Even a tacit agreement is
enough.o
One. might expect that the prosecution would always agree to admit
evidence of the defendant's bad character, but it is less conceivable that
defendants would agree to admit evidence of their own bad character. If
the defendant thinks that the bad character evidence was useful to his
case, he will admit it under gateway (b), discussed below. Thus, this
exception generally applies to the prosecution's attempt to offer bad
character evidence of the defendant where the defendant does not object
to such an offer.
B. Gateway (b): When the Defendant Brings in His
Own Bad Character
The criminal defendant can access gateway (b) to offer evidence of
his own bad character.-' He can present evidence through his own testi-
mony or that of his own witnesses, as well as upon cross-examination of
other witnesses.5 2 The defendant is deemed responsible for offering the
bad character evidence unless he does so inadvertently, such as in
49. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(a).
50. See R v. Marsh, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2696, [46] (Eng.). In Marsh, the defendant's lover,
who confessed to killing his wife, testified that the defendant was aroused by cutting during sexual
gratification and that he had arranged an alibi for his wife's killing. Id. at [5], [10], [44]. Evidence
that the defendant had arranged a false alibi before, when he planned to attack someone who had
wronged him, was also admitted. Id. at [44]. The defendant appealed the admission of this
evidence as "not relevant to any issue concerning the appellant's part in the murder of [his wife]."
Id. at [45]. All the parties, however, had already agreed that the evidence was relevant and should
be admitted, so the court found that it was admissible. Id. at [46]. The court still questioned
whether the conviction would stand had the evidence not been admitted, and found that it was
both relevant and necessary in showing the defendant's control over the witness and whether he
had acted by plan or spontaneity. Id. at [47].
51. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(b).
52. See id. The Crown Prosecution Service notes that:
The [defendant's] bad character is admissible if it is adduced by himself, or is given
in answer to a question asked by him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it.
This allows a defendant to adduce his own bad character if it is felt that it would be
helpful to do so. There may be circumstances where a defendant chooses to do this.
Examples may include-where a defendant raises an alibi that he was in prison at
the time; where his bad character is relatively innocuous in the context of the trial,
that he might prefer to put it in evidence rather than leave it to the jury to speculate
about it; or if he considers that his own character while bad, is less likely to indicate
guilt than that of a person alleges was criminal.
Bad Character Evidence, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.cps.gov.uk/
legal/a to_c/badcharacterevidence.
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response to a poorly drafted question on direct or cross-examination, or
when a witness simply "goes rogue.""
While the notion of bringing in bad character evidence of one's
own accord is counter intuitive, there are situations where doing so is an
appropriate strategy. For instance, where the defendant has an alibi that
requires disclosure of misconduct (e.g., he was committing adultery dur-
ing the time the crime occurred), or when his character is less bad than
that of a co-defendant, it may make sense for him to introduce evidence
of his bad character.5 4
C. Gateway (c): Important Explanatory Evidence for the Jury
Character evidence is admissible through gateway (c) when the jury
needs that evidence to understand the case." The evidence must have
"substantial value" or be evidence without which the jury would find it
"impossible or difficult" to understand the case." Evidence that helps
the jury understand the background, history, or context of the case fits in
this category as well." For instance, evidence of a defendant's prior
instances of drug dealing could be admissible under this gateway to
explain why the victim recognized the defendant" or to explain the
defendant's irrational behavior.59 As noted above, evidence about what
happened in the case itself is not character evidence and therefore does
not need a gateway to be admissible.60
Evidence is admissible through this gateway regardless of whether
53. See id. The CPS goes on to note that "evidence is inadmissible if the defendant did not
intend to elicit the evidence, such as an unsolicited disclosure by a witness of a defendant's bad
character or evidence of bad character elicited in cross-examination due to a carelessly framed
question." Id.
54. Id.
55. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(c).
56. Id. § 102(a)-(b). This provision specifically states that:
For the purposes of section 101(l)(c) evidence is important explanatory evidence if
(a) without it, the court or jury would find it impossible or difficult properly to
understand other evidence in the case, and
(b) its value for understanding the case as a whole is substantial.
Id.
57. See, e.g., R v. Edwards, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3244, [101], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1524 (Eng.).
58. See id. The witness recognized the defendant because she had bought drugs from him four
times previously, and her testimony was strengthened by the frequency of their encounters. The
judge found that it would "be difficult properly to understand other evidence in the case without
knowing the background of the heroin dealings," concluding that this evidence was admissible
because it "went to the heart of matters."
59. See R v. Chapman, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2545, [32] (Eng.) (finding evidence of drug
addiction and prior conviction for drug possession in a murder and possession of firearms case
admissible under gateway (c) to explain "otherwise inexplicable and irrational behaviour").
60. See Criminal Justice Act § 98(a)-(b). This section excludes from the character definition
the facts of the offense or of "misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of
that [charged] offence." Id.
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the accused has offered any evidence in the case. 6 1 In order for the evi-
dence to be admitted through gateway (c), it must clear up a missing part
of the surrounding context and be necessary to understanding the situa-
tion as a whole.62 Gateway (c) is not a significant departure from the
common law because "so-called 'background evidence"' was admissi-
ble at common law. 63
D. Gateway (d): Important Matter at Issue Between the
Prosecution and Defense
Gateway (d) admits evidence that involves "important matters at
issue between the defense and the prosecution."' These "important
matters at issue" include credibility and any other matters that must be
established to support the charge, or that are needed to support a
defense.65 One commentator notes that the only evidence that does not
fit within this gateway is evidence "of relatively minor or marginal sig-
nificance."66 Therefore, this provision greatly expands the admissibility
of character evidence over the prior law. It is important to note that this
gateway provides a mechanism for admitting prosecution evidence only,
not evidence by or on behalf of the criminal defendant. 67
1. USING PRIOR BAD ACTS TO SHOW PROPENSITY TO COMMIT
THE CHARGED CRIME
These "important matters at issue" also include situations where the
defendant has a propensity to commit the kind of offense with which he
is charged. 68 There is a much greater scope of character evidence admis-
sible under this gateway than under prior law. While propensity evi-
dence was generally inadmissible under prior law, it is generally
admissible under the 2003 CJA.70 Prior bad acts are admissible to show
propensity, regardless of whether or not they resulted in convictions. For
instance, this gateway permits the prosecution to offer evidence of
61. See Criminal Justice Act § 101(1)(c).
62. See id.
63. KEANE, supra note 1, at 369.
64. Criminal Justice Act § 101(d).
65. See CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, supra note 52.
66. KEANE, supra note 1, at 378.
67. Criminal Justice Act § 103(6). If the defendant wishes to admit his own bad character
evidence, he may do so under gateway (b) or gateway (a) as discussed above.
68. See Criminal Justice Act § 103(1)(a).
69. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 478 ("The test is one of simple relevance or probative value.
There is no requirement of enhanced relevance or 'substantial probative value' as there is under
section 101(1)(e) ..... (citation omitted)).
70. See id. at 481 (citing R v. Chopra, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2133, [121, [2007] 1 Cr. App. 16
(Eng.)).
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sequencing, such as where the same person committed multiple offenses
as part of a larger plan."
There is no set number of offenses, bad acts, or convictions neces-
sary to establish a propensity.7 2 One court did find, however, that "a
single previous conviction for an offence of the same description or cat-
egory ... may [show propensity] where it shows a tendency to unusual
behavior, or where the circumstances demonstrate probative force in
relation to the offence charged."7 ' The court cited abusing children and
setting fires as examples. 74 The court then found that a prior conviction
for waving an imitation gun was sufficiently unusual and probative to
show propensity in the current case, where the defendant was charged
with possessing an imitation firearm with an attempt to cause fear of
violence.7 ' The propensity here was based on the similarity of con-
duct.76 Needless to say that courts have found evidence of this kind of
propensity to be lacking in other cases.
Another situation where a prior bad act may be admissible is where
the defendant has been convicted of a similar offense in the same cate-
gory as the charged offense.7 1 Only two categories have been specifi-
cally identified: theft offenses and sexual offenses.79 When the
prosecution relies upon the specific facts of the underlying prior convic-
tion, then the courts will permit evidence of those underlying facts.o
Convictions will be excluded if admitting them would result in injustice
or unfairness to the criminal defendant. One factor courts consider in
evaluating unfairness is the length of time since the prior conviction.82
The 2003 CJA specifically excludes prior bad acts to show propen-
sity when the character evidence of "propensity makes it no more likely"
71. See, e.g., R v. Wallace, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1760, [14], [17], [2008] 1 W.L.R. 572
(Eng.) (admitting evidence of prior armed robberies of small businesses in a particular area with
common features that suggest defendant was a part of all of them).
72. See DPP v. P, [1991] 2 A.C. 447 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
73. R v. Bernasconi, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1052, [16] (Eng.).
74. Id.
75. Id. at [18]. See also R v. Long, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 578, [13] (Eng.) ("[This Court]
doubts that [R v. Hanson, [2005] EWCA Crim 824, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3169 (Eng.)] is authority for
the proposition that one conviction is inadequate to show propensity.").
76. Id.
77. See R v. Ainscough, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 694, [13], [2006] J.P. 517 (Eng.) (evidence
from the Police National Computer was admitted through gateway (d) but later denied on appeal
as not enough to rely on); R v. B, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 1254, [20] [2004] 2 Crim. App. 34 (Eng.)
(Crown attempted to admit propensity evidence for sexual offenses but was denied because it was
not factually relevant).
78. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 481.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 480-81.
81. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 § 101(3) (Eng.).
82. Id. § 101(4).
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that the defendant committed the charged offense.83  There is some
debate about when this exception applies. For instance, some commenta-
tors state that the "[2003] CJA is less interested in 'tendency' than the
previous law."84 Others explain that the ultimate question is: "Does the
evidence of propensity add nothing more than prejudice to the prosecu-
tion?"" Another notes that a "propensity in a defendant that makes guilt
no more likely is an oxymoron waiting to happen."8 6 What is clear is
that the 2003 CJA "meant to exclude from the bad character provisions
cases where there is no dispute between prosecution and defence con-
cerning the facts, only over the legal significance of what occurred.""
The easiest cases are those where the facts are undisputed, and the
only issue is whether the charged offense can be proven based on those
facts. A common illustration of this situation is a homicide case where
the question is whether the defendant's actions caused the death of the
victim," or whether the defendant had the requisite specific intent for a
murder conviction.
Even when there is no dispute about the facts (e.g., defendant
struck victim over the head and victim died), however, there can be legal
significance as to whether the crime was manslaughter based on a heat-
of-passion or mutual combat theory, or murder based on premeditation
and deliberation or extreme recklessness. Past violent acts of a similar
83. Id. § 103(1)(a).
84. Criminal Justice Act, L. ESSAYS U.K., http://www.law-essays-uk.com/resources/free-
essays/criminal-justice-act.php (last visited Aug. 11, 2011).
85. Robert Hall, Criminal Justice Act 2003 Bad Character Provisions, ONE KING's BENCH
WALK, 5-6 (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.lkbw.co.uk/_datalassets/pdf-file/0004/9544/bad-
character-provisionslecturenotes_160305.pdf.
86. Roderick Munday, Bad Character Rules and Riddles: "Explanatory Notes" and the True
Meanings of S.103(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 2005 CRIM. L. REV. 337, 338. Munday
explains that when the prosecution seeks to offer evidence of propensity:
it is open to that defendant to introduce evidence showing that, statistically or
logically speaking, these previous convictions-say by reason of their nature, by
reason of their different modes of commission, or by reason of their infrequency-
do not demonstrate that the defendant has a "propensity to commit offences of the
kind with which he is charged."
Id. at 338.
87. See Munday, supra note 86, at 339 (citing Criminal Justice Act (explanatory note [371])).
88. See Criminal Justice Act (explanatory note [371]) (because causation is not related to a
tendency to behave in a particular way, propensity would not help with this issue).
89. See Bullen v. R, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 4, [30], [2008] 2 Crim. App. 25 (Eng.) ("We can
see that causation generally lies wholly in the facts of a particular case, and does not depend on a
propensity."). But see R v. Rees, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1837, [17]-[28] (Eng.). In Rees, a
defendant with a history of partner abuse was facing a murder or manslaughter conviction for
allegedly beating his girlfriend to death. Id. at [1]. Though the trial judge declined to admit the
defendant's entire record of partner abuse out of concern that such evidence would be unduly
prejudicial, the judge still permitted one of the defendant's battered ex-girlfriends to testify. Id. at
[17]-[18]. The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's decision. Id. at [27]-[28].
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nature would tend to be helpful explanatory evidence in determining the
legal significance of the facts surrounding the fatal blow.
2. DEMONSTRATING A PROPENSITY FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS
Important matters at issue under gateway (d) also include the defen-
dant's propensity to be untruthful.90 Under prior law, all crimes were
potentially relevant to credibility. 9 1 The 2003 CJA has a more circum-
spect approach. The explanatory notes indicate that only a "limited
range" of convictions are admissible under this gateway.92 For instance,
stealing from a store is dishonest, but not untruthful. Conversely,
defrauding someone generally involves untruthfulness.93
Examples of previous convictions that establish propensity towards
untruthfulness include where the defendant testified in the prior case and
the jury must have disbelieved his testimony in order to convict him,
where the elements of the prior crime involve untruthfulness, and where
the defendant "exhibited lies or deception" in committing the prior
offense. 94 When the prior conviction shows a propensity towards vio-
90. Criminal Justice Act § 103(l)(b).
91. See Munday, supra note 86, at 340. Munday states:
Under the old law, when it came to credibility, all manner of offences were treated
as relevant to someone's credibility. Moreover, there was a complex case law, and
learning besides, debating whether similar previous offending was relevant to
credibility or whether it was just too close to issue for comfort; whether offences of
dishonesty were especially relevant to someone's credibility; whether antecedent
not guilty pleas or similar defences, run unsuccessfully, were relevant to credit; and
whether details of previous offences were admissible, too. Initially, in view of the
otherwise highly repressive character of this statute, one might have assumed that a
goodly proportion of the evidence admitted previously, once credibility became an
issue, would fall within this generously expressed provision. But once more, turning
to the Explanatory Notes, one discovers that appearances may deceive.
Id. (citations omitted).
92. Munday, supra note 86, at 340. The explanatory notes provide that:
[s]ection 103(l)(b) makes it clear that evidence relating to whether the defendant
has a propensity to be untruthful (in other words, is not to be regarded as a credible
witness) can be admitted. This is intended to enable the admission of a limited
range of evidence such as convictions for perjury or other offences involving
deception (for example, obtaining property by deception), as opposed to the wider
range of evidence that will be admissible where the defendant puts his character in
issue by for example, attacking the character of another person.
Id.
93. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 499 (distinguishing untruthfulness from dishonesty); R v.
Lawson, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2572, [33], [2007] 1 Crim. App. 11 (Eng.) ("[A] previous
conviction for an offence of dishonesty will not necessarily be capable of establishing a propensity
for untruthfulness." (citing R v. Hanson, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 824, [13], [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3169
(Eng.))).
94. See Peter Mirfield, Character and Credibility, 2009 CRIM. L. REv. 135, 138. Mirfield sets
forth three corresponding scenarios where previous convictions may establish propensity towards
untruthfulness: first, where the previous crime involved lying, such as "perjury or obtaining by
deception," where by definition they entail the "telling of lies;" second, where the parties actually
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lence, it will not be admissible to prove untruthfulness under gateway
(d), but it may be admissible to prove a propensity towards violence."
For example, where a defendant was on trial for a burglary commit-
ted in 2007 and was subsequently arrested for a burglary in 2008 to
which he pleaded guilty, it was error for the judge to admit evidence of
the 2008 burglary under gateway (d) in the trial for the 2007 burglary.96
Because the defendant had pled guilty, the 2008 burglary conviction did
not relate to untruthfulness (although one could say that it related to his
truthfulness)."
The defendant's character for untruthfulness is relevant in every
case except in the unusual circumstance where there is no suggestion
that he has been untruthful in any respect.98 This situation arises when
the issue is a pure question of law. For instance, where the facts are
undisputed about a death resulting from blows to the stomach during a
fistfight, the prosecution may have no quibble with the defendant's reci-
tation of the facts. Instead, the case is about the meaning of those facts in
determining whether the facts prove homicide or self-defense. In that
situation, the prosecution cannot submit evidence of the defendant's
character for untruthfulness though this gateway.
E. Gateway (e): Substantial Probative Value for an Important
Matter at Issue Between Co-defendants
Co-defendants can use gateway (e) to offer bad character evidence
about their fellow defendant.99 This gateway is not open to the prosecu-
tion.'" In addition, the trial judge has "no discretionary power to
exclude" this evidence.'o' Co-defendants frequently use this gateway
lied or deceived in their actions; third, when a party pleads not guilty but is still convicted, it
seems an obvious assumption the jury found that the party was lying. Id.
95. Mirfield, supra note 94, at 139-40. See, e.g., R v. McDonald, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1194,
[26] (Eng.) (where the jury was incorrectly informed that previous convictions were relevant to
credibility, convictions were deemed unsafe and were overturned); R v. Meyer, [2006) EWCA
(Crim) 1126, [181-[29] (Eng.); R v. Awaritefe, [20071 EWCA (Crim) 706, [24j-[261 (Eng.). R v.
Culhane, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1053, [29] (Eng.).
96. See R v. Laurusevicius, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 3020, [21] (Eng.).
97. Id. at [20]-[2 1] (explaining that "[the 2008 burglary arrest] showed that on that occasion
he was a burglar but not that he was an untruthful burglar"). For this reason, the court held that the
evidence of the 2008 burglary should not have been admitted. Id.
98. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 103(1)(b) (Eng.).
99. Id. § 101(l)(e). For purposes of brevity and clarity, the remainder of this section will refer
to the party opposing the admissibility of that evidence as the defendant. The party proffering the
character evidence will be referred to as the co-defendant.
100. Id. § 104(2)(a)-(b).
101. KEANE, supra note 1, at 500; R v. Lawson, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2572, [31], [2007] 1
Crim. App. 11 (Eng.) ("Once gateway (e) is passed, there is no discretion in the judge to exclude
bad character evidence as there is where application is made by the Crown under gateway (d) or
(g).").
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when they rely upon what is known as a "cut-throat [defense]" where
each defendant claims the other is solely responsible for the crime. 0 2
This often involves denying ownership of drugs or weapons. 1
This gateway significantly expanded the prior law." Formerly,
when a defendant took the stand and gave evidence against another co-
defendant, the testifying defendant was subject to cross-examination
about his own bad character.o10 The rationale was to let the co-defendant
elicit whatever evidence he could to discredit the testifying defendant
and thereby convince the jury that the defendant was the one guilty of
the charged crime. 106 Now, under the 2003 CJA, the evidence is admis-
sible whenever the defendant's case is undermined by a co-defendant;
the defendant's testimony and a direct attack are not required.' 0
By limiting the responsive use of bad character evidence to that
which has "substantial probative value," the 2003 CJA provides some
restrictions on the common law rule of co-defendant character evi-
dence."0 s The 2003 CJA expands, however, the scope of admissible
character evidence beyond that which helps to establish credibility to
issues of propensity. Thus, testimony is not required to trigger this use
of bad character evidence.109
Evidence that makes the co-defendant's version of the events more
likely than the defendant's version has substantial probative value under
gateway (e).' 1 o Courts have found a wide range of character evidence
admissible under this gateway.' For instance, evidence introduced by a
102. See CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, supra note 52.
103. See id.
104. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 469. Keane points out that gateways (e), (f), and (g) all
"broadly correspond to and widen pre-existing grounds of admissibility." Id.
105. See Lawson, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2572 at [32].
106. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 500.
107. Compare Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 104(1) (Eng.), with Murdoch v. Taylor,
[1965] A.C. 574 (H.L.) 587 (appeal taken from Eng.).
108. See Lawson, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2572 at [32].
109. See id.
[O]nce defendant A had given evidence against defendant B, which included any
case in which the nature or conduct of his defence undermined that of B, there was
no restriction upon what could be put to him in cross-examination. The earlier
statute proceeded by providing the defendant with a shield against cross-
examination as to bad character, but then stipulating that he lost that shield in
certain circumstances of which this was one. The new statute proceeds by a different
route. Cross-examination as to credit is no longer unrestrained. Whether evidence of
bad character is adduced by cross-examination of the defendant or otherwise, it
must have substantial probative value in relation to the issue.
Id.
110. See id. at [43] (citation omitted).
111. See, e.g., R v. Rosato, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1243, [20]-[23] (Eng.). In Rosato, the court
explained that:
[A] person whose history of criminal behaviour or other misconduct is such as to be
96 [Vol. 66:79
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co-defendant that the defendant had prior instances of holding and then
stealing jewelry being offered for sale on consignment has substantial
probative value.1 2 In addition, where a co-defendant testifies that it was
the defendant who was the sole perpetrator of a robbery, evidence that
the defendant had prior shoplifting convictions is properly admissible by
the prosecution under gateway (e).311 Evidence that a defendant con-
fessed to the charged crime also makes the co-defendant's version more
likely than that of the defendant.l 14
F. Gateway (f): To Correct a False Impression
Given by the Defendant
Gateway (f) permits the prosecution to offer bad character evidence
about the criminal defendant when the defendant is responsible for mak-
ing an express or implied assertion apt to give the court or jury a mis-
leading impression about him."' The assertion must be about the
capable of showing him to be unscrupulous and/or otherwise unreliable should be
enabled to present that history before the jury for its evaluation of the evidence of
the witness. Such suggested unreliability may be capable of being shown by conduct
which does not involve an offence of untruthfulness; it may be capable of being
shown by widely differing conduct, ranging from large scale drug-or people-
trafficking via housebreaking to criminal violence. Whether in a particular case it is
in fact capable of having substantive probative value in relation to the witness'
reliability is for the trial Judge to determine on all the facts of the case.
Id. at [20] (quoting Lawson, [2006] EWCA 2572 at [34]). The Rosato court determined that prior
convictions involving theft and burglary were properly admissible by a co-defendant under this
gateway. Id. at [23].
112. See R v. Jarvis, [20081 EWCA (Crim) 488, [19]-[20], [2008] Crim. L.R. 632 (Eng.). But
cf R v. Land, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2856, [40]-[51] (Eng.) (evidence that a sword, body armor, a
gas canister, and heroin were recovered from the co-defendant's home during prior searches was
not necessarily substantially probative towards the co-defendant's duress defense, and declining to
admit this evidence did not make the conviction unsafe).
113. See R v. Davies, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 957, [9]-[21] (Eng.). See also R v. Randall,
[2003] UKHL 69, [29], [2004] 1 W.L.R. 56 (appeal taken from Eng.) (citing other authorities
suggesting that the propensity of a co-accused may be relevant).
114. See Musone v. R, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1237, [46], [2007] 1 W.L.R. 2467 (Eng.) (noting
that while "[c]learly section 101(e) imposes a higher requirement than that of mere relevance as
demonstrated by the contrasting adjectives within section 101(l)(d) and (e)," the meaning of
["]substantial["] is not clearly defined and the explanatory notes "suggest that the reference to
substantial was only intended to exclude evidence of marginal or trivial value."(citation omitted));
R v. Recica, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 2471, [24]-[25] (Eng.) (holding that the prior convictions for
fraud of one co-defendant where the co-defendants were brothers charged with conspiracy to
violate immigration laws were admissible under this gateway). A prior conviction for robbery,
however, does not provide much assistance to a jury in a case when the jury is deciding between
murder and manslaughter; the prior conviction can be used for propensity purpose, but only when
the jury receives an appropriate instruction from the judge about how to use it. See R v. B, [2008]
EWCA (Crim) 1402, [3]-[4] (Eng.) (finding that the lack of proper jury instruction made the
conviction unsafe).
115. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 101(1)(f), 105(1)(a) (Eng.).
98 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:79
accused and not about mere witnesses or other people.' 1 6
The defendant is responsible for both the assertions he makes at
trial as well as those that he elicits from any witness (as long as the
information was not an unintended or inadvertent response to a question
not designed to elicit that information)."' 7 This standard is very broad.
Claiming to be employed or religious, wearing a certain type of clothing
(though not simply dressing up for court), or only confessing to one
prior offense when guilty of others can open the path to this gateway."'
On the other hand, asserting that a defendant has only one prior convic-
tion when he may have other charges pending, does not create a false
impression."9 Determining whether the defendant has created a false or
misleading impression is very fact-specific.120
While gateway (f) is easy to enter, it is also easy to escape by with-
drawal or disassociation.121 A defendant who simply gets caught in an
overstatement, however, cannot withdraw or disassociate himself from
the misimpression.122
116. See R v. Hanson, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 824, [51], [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3169 (Eng.). If the
accused states, for example, that the complainant is fabricating the story about the offense, that is
not a false impression about the accused, and thus the gateway remains shut.
117. Criminal Justice Act § 105(2).
118. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 509.
119. See R v. U, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1457, [6]-[9], [15] (Eng.). In R v. U, a defendant
charged with a drug offense wanted to present evidence that he had only one previous conviction
for assault when he was a youth. Id. at [6]. The defendant, however, was also soon to be tried on
robbery and false imprisonment charges arising from the same transaction. Id. at [10]. The Crown
argued that if the former conviction was offered to show that the defendant was not that bad a guy,
then the pending trial evidence should be admitted as well, to correct a false impression. Id. The
trial judge agreed, and so the defendant decided to forego bringing in the evidence of the single
conviction. Id. at [12]-[13]. This error by the trial court rendered the conviction unsafe. Id. at [15].
120. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 509.
121. See Hall, supra note 85, at 7.
122. See R v. Renda, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2826, [16]-[17], [19], [21], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2948
(Eng.). In Renda, the defendant attempted to convey that he was a good person, stating that he had
served in the military, been injured during his service, and that he had held a job as a security
guard. Id. at [16]. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that while it was true that he had
served in the armed forces, he suffered his injury while on holiday away from his military service,
and his so-called "security guard" job was only a short-term position checking passes. Id. at [17].
The prosecution then used gateway (f) to ask questions about his previous convictions involving
violent behavior that had to do with his credibility. Id. at [19]. The defense objected, arguing that
his responses on cross-examination were adequate to disassociate himself from the false
impression and to close gateway (f). Id. at [21]. The appellate court disagreed, stating:
There is a significant difference between the defendant who makes a specific and
positive decision to correct a false impression for which he is responsible, or to
dissociate himself from false impressions conveyed by the assertions of others, and
the defendant who in the process of cross-examination is obliged to concede that he
has been misleading the jury. A concession extracted in cross-examination that the
defendant was not telling the truth in part of his examination-in-chief will not
normally amount to a withdrawal or dissociation from the original assertion for the
purposes of [section] 105(3).
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This gateway is an expansion on the prior law, which permitted a
prosecution response with bad character if the defendant offered good
character evidence.123 While under former law a defendant had to put his
own character at issue before bad character evidence could be intro-
duced under this gateway, today merely mentioning a circumstance that
gives a false impression can open this gateway to cross-examination
about the defendant's bad character. Despite this broad reading, courts
do not consider denying a charge,124 or simply claiming a defense in
written documents submitted to the court and the prosecution, to be "cre-
ating a false impression."l 25
Only the prosecution can admit evidence through this gateway, and
the evidence will be limited to that which is "necessary to correct the
false impression." 26 Thus, the admitted evidence must have some rele-
vance and some probative value towards correcting the misimpres-
sion.127 The jurors are instructed to use the information provided to
correct the false impression as they deem relevant.128
Id.
123. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 508. Keane notes that gateway (f) is an expansion of the prior
law because the prior law was like that of the FRE. If the accused opens the door by presenting
good character evidence, then the prosecution could respond with bad character evidence in
rebuttal. Id.
124. See A.J. Roberts, Evidence: Criminal Justice Act 2003 Part II - Bad Character
Provisions, 2006 CRIM. L. REv. 433, 434-35 ("[A] simple denial could not be treated as giving a
false impression."). The article also discusses the case of R v. Weir, where one's denial of raping a
woman was not a misimpression, but he "put himself forward as a man who not only had no
previous convictions but also enjoyed a good reputation as a priest and was the victim of a
conspiracy hatched up by members of the Mauritian community." Id. at 435. These
misimpressions as to his own character are what opened gateway (f) and allowed in evidence of
why his employment was terminated. Id.
125. See R v. Iqbal, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1302, [16] (Eng.). In Iqbal, the court ruled that the
defendant's pleadings and documents that set forth the contentions and nature of his defense did
not constitute "an impression about him, let alone a false or misleading one without begging the
very question which the jury would have to determine." Id. See also KEANE, supra note 1, at 509.
126. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 105(6) (Eng.).
127. See R v. Assani, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2653, [5], [1l]-[13], [2009] Crim. L.R. 514
(Eng.). In Assani, after hearing a defense witness state that the defendant was not the type of
person to "turn around and stab someone, nor was he one to 'throw his weight around,"' the court
ruled that evidence of a prior incident of the defendant hitting a person in the face with a shovel,
fourteen years prior to the current trial, was properly excluded because the single incident was so
long ago that it did not establish a propensity towards violence and thus did not have probative
value. Id.
128. See R v. Doncaster, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 5, [41], [43], [2008] J.P. 202 (Eng.). The
Doncaster court explained that perhaps the judge should instruct the jury to consider "which
counted with them more-the absence of previous convictions or the evidence of bad character;
and if the former, then they should take that into account in favour of the defendant, and if the
latter, then they would be entitled to take that into account against him." Id. at [43].
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G. Gateway (g): Defendant Attacks Another Person's Character
A defendant opens gateway (g) when he introduces evidence
attacking another person's character, when he asks a question on cross-
examination intended to elicit a character attack on another, or when he
challenges the character of another while being questioned, charged or
officially told that he might be prosecuted for the charged offense.12 9
The other person need not be a party, victim, or witness in the case, but
must be an identifiable individual, rather than a category or class or peo-
ple.'3 0 Once the door has been opened, whether at trial or before trial,
only the prosecution can respond with evidence attacking the defen-
dant's character.13 1 Co-defendants may not use this gateway.132
The prosecution may attack a person's character by offering evi-
dence that the person has committed an offense, or has behaved or is
disposed to behave, in a "reprehensible" way.133 The Crown Prosecu-
tion Service states that terminology in (g) is "particularly wide and what
behaving in a reprehensible way means will vary from generation to
generation." 3 4 For instance, in Lamaletie v. R, an accustation that a per-
son started a fight and "was attacking me everywhere" qualified as an
allegation of "reprehensible conduct."13  The court explained that where
the character of one person is attacked in this way, the jury is entitled to
know about the character of the accuser as well through gateway (g). 13 6
Where a defendant alleged that the police were trying to "set him up" or
"stitch him up," and the defendant "attacked the bona fides" of the
police officers and accused them of "discreditable conduct," that was
enough to admit the bad character evidence through gateway (g) as long
as no unfairness would result."' Simply being known for shouting a lot,
in contrast, does not constitute a character attack or an allegation of
129. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(g).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 106(3).
132. See R v. Edwards, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3244, [18], [25], [51], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1524
(Eng.). In Edwards, each co-defendant blamed the other for the large quantity of drugs found in
their possession and sought to admit evidence of the other's non-drug convictions. Id. at [8]. The
court found it was error to admit prior convictions under gateway (g) when offered by a co-
defendant. Id. at [18]. It must come in under gateway (e). Id. at [25]. Similarly, in a case involving
violence reported in the same decision, prior convictions of a violent nature committed by one co-
defendant and offered by another co-defendant were determined to have "substantial probative
value" and thus were admissible under gateway (e). Id. at [51] (citation omitted).
133. See id. at [24].
134. CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, supra note 52. The Crown Prosecution Service correlates
acting "in a reprehensible way" with the definition of "bad character." Id.
135. Lamaletie v. R, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 314, [8] (Eng.).
136. Id. at [15] (citation omitted).
137. See R v. Williams, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1951, [20] (Eng.).
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"reprehensible" behavior. 3 8
Evidence under gateway (g) is admissible whether or not the
accused testifies.' This is a departure from common law, which only
opened this door if the accused testified at trial. 14 0 Nevertheless, in R v.
Littlechild, the court pointed out that "in the case of gateway (g) it may
well be that there is a greater overlap between the old law and new than
there is in some other areas." 4 ' Under the former law, suggesting that a
complaining witness fabricated her story would not amount to a charac-
ter attack, but that same suggestion does amount to such an attack under
gateway (g).142 The court cannot admit evidence under this gateway if
there is an adverse effect on fairness, the length of time passed being a
key consideration. 4 3 Another fairness consideration is that the respond-
ing bad character evidence admitted against the defendant must be in
proportion to the attack on the other person."
There is some uncertainty about the scope of this gateway. Accord-
ing to some authorities, evidence admitted under the gateway can be
used not only for credibility, but also for propensity purposes.'45 Others
disagree, finding that the relevance of evidence admitted under this gate-
way is limited to credibility.146 Keane acknowledges that while former
law limited the gateway's use to credibility, today, evidence of propen-
138. See R v. Osbourne, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 481, [14], [34] (Eng.). In Osbourne, one
witness testified that "[i]f he did not have his medication, he was liable to snap at any time." Id. at
[14]. He stated that "[the defendant] would be very aggressive for no reason at all-both to me
and Shane; shouting at us. But he was never violent." Id. The appellate court found that:
[I]n the context of this charge of murder, we do not accept that shouting at a partner
in the manner described can amount to reprehensible behavior within the meaning
of Section 202 of the 2003 Act. Shouting between partners over the care of a very
young child is not of course to be commended but in the context of a charge of
murdering a close friend, it does not cross the threshold contemplated by the words
of the statute.
Id. at [34].
139. KEANE, supra note 1, at 511.
140. See id. (citing R v. Butterwasser, [1948] 1 K.B. 4 [5]-[6] (Eng.)).
141. R v. Littlechild, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 2126, [16] (Eng.). The Littlechild court goes on to
state:
There are of course many differences between the scheme of the old Act and the
scheme of the new. Cross-examination as to credit is no longer unrestrained. Bad
character evidence may be admitted whether the defendant gives evidence or not,
and when it is admissible it now goes to propensity to commit the offence in
situations where previously it went only to credit. Those are only examples of the
differences, but they underlie the necessity to work from the new Act forward rather
than to look backwards to the old.
Id. at [17].
142. See R v. Hanson, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 824, [51]-[52], [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3169 (Eng.).
143. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(3)-(4) (Eng.).
144. See Roberts, supra note 124, at 711.
145. See R v. Highton, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1985, [22], [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3472, (22] (Eng.).
146. See R v. Lafayette, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 3238, [48]-[49], [2009] Crim L.R. 809 (Eng.).
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sity to commit offenses of the type similar to the charged offense can be
admitted under gateway (g) and thus be used by the jury for a propensity
purpose. 4 7 Based on the conflicting authorities, it seems that the courts
are still sorting out the scope of gateway (g).
This completes the summary of the 2003 CJA. The next section
examines the differences between the admission and uses of bad charac-
ter evidence through these gateways and the corresponding FRE.
III. PART THREE: CONTRASTING OUTCOMES UNDER THE 2003
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Gateway (a) Does Not Have a Corresponding Federal Rule
Recall that gateway (a) permits evidence of the defendant's bad
character "if, but only if, all parties to the proceeding agree to the evi-
dence being admissible."l 48 The FRE do not contain an explicit mecha-
nism that permits the parties to agree to admit character evidence that
otherwise violates the Rules. As a practical matter, however, character
evidence that violates the FRE can be admitted if neither the prosecution
nor the defense objects.' 49 The federal prosecutor would not object to a
defendant offering good character evidence because it opens the door to
a prosecution response with bad character evidence under FRE 404. Liti-
gators know that the jury is more likely to focus on the negative charac-
ter evidence and thus the defense is likely to object."'o
If neither party objects, a judge could make a decision to exclude
the evidence in the absence of an objection, but judges are unlikely to do
In considering how evidence admissible under gateway (g) but not under gateway (d) should be
used, the Lafayette court reasoned:
[T]he better course is for the direction to be so fashioned in a gateway (g) only case
that the jury understand that the relevance of these kinds of previous convictions
goes to credit and they should not consider that it shows a propensity to commit the
offence they are considering, at least if there is a risk that they might do so. That is
not to say that the words "credit" and "propensity" should be or need to be used.
Id. at [49].
147. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 470. See also R v. Livesey, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 361, [12]
(Eng.). The Livesey court noted:
To the extent that cross-examination as to credit is no longer unrestrained, but must
if it involves a suggestion of past bad character events pass the test of judicial
admission under section 100, the present law is less, rather than more, likely to give
rise to cross-examination upon past unproven complaints.
Id.
148. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(a).
149. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence . . . unless a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record").
150. Goodman, supra note 23, at 2.
102 [Vol. 66:79
2011] THE GATE(WAY)S OF HELL AND PATHWAYS TO PURGATORY 103
so unless a substantial right or privilege is impacted.15' Thus, the effect
of neither side objecting under the FRE would be substantially the same
as an agreement by both sides under the 2003 CJA.
Gateway (a) also permits the prosecution to offer bad character evi-
dence about the defendant even before the defendant opens the door to
his character. 15 2 Some would say that the same outcome applies under
the FRE, if the defendant does not object. A court is likely to find, how-
ever, that a miscarriage of justice has occurred when the prosecution
introduces character evidence in its case-in-chief that violates FRE 404
and no exception is available to render that evidence admissible.15 3
B. Gateway (b) is More Restrictive than FRE 404
Gateway (b) allows evidence that is "adduced by the defendant
himself or is given in answer to a question asked by him in cross-exami-
nation and intended to elicit it."l 54 Gateway (b) is similar to FRE
404(a)(1), which permits the accused to offer character evidence about a
pertinent character trait.' 55
The 2003 CJA is both broader and narrower than the FRE here. The
2003 CJA is narrower because gateway (b) applies to evidence of bad
character only, and thus not the type of evidence that a defendant usually
offers on his own behalf under FRE 404(a)(1). In some cases, a defen-
dant may offer evidence of his bad character in order to inoculate against
the prosecution presenting the evidence later.'"' The prosecution cannot
prevent the defendant from offering character evidence on a pertinent
trait under the FRE (unless the undue prejudice is great enough to tip the
balance in favor of excluding the evidence under FRE 403). "
Gateway (b) is also narrower than FRE 404(a)(1) because it does
not allow the prosecution to respond to the defendant's evidence admit-
ted through it.'5 The prosecution is not permitted to offer any evidence
through gateway (b), whereas the FRE gives the prosecution an opportu-
nity, in fairness, to offer evidence to rebut whatever evidence the defen-
151. See FED. R. Evio. 103(d) ("Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.").
152. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(a).
153. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 248 (noting that "the dangers of
prejudice outweigh the probative value" before the accused has opened the door to character
exception).
154. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(b).
155. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
156. See L. TIMOTHY PERRIN ET AL., THE ART & SCIENCE OF TRIAL ADVOCACY 220-24
(2003).
157. FED. R. EVID. 403.
158. FED. R. EVID. 404.
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dant offers about his own (usually good) character trait.' 9 The rationale
for this distinction might simply be that this gateway only applies to bad
character evidence, and thus when the defendant uses it to offer bad
character evidence about himself, the prosecution has no need to
respond to that bad character evidence with more bad character evi-
dence. In contrast, FRE 404(a)(1) generally involves the defendant
offering good character evidence about himself and thus the prosecution
needs a mechanism for responding.16 0
In the United Kingdom, the defendant's ability to offer his own
good character evidence is not governed by the 2003 *CJA, but rather by
common law.161 If in response to that good character evidence the prose-
cutor would like to offer bad character evidence about the accused, there
are several other gateways available for this purpose, including gateway
(c): important explanatory; gateway (d): relevant to a matter at issue
between defendant and prosecution; or gateway (f): to correct a false
impression given by the defendant.162
Another way in which the 2003 CJA and the FRE differ is that the
FRE is limited to opinion and reputation character evidence if the defen-
dant is offering evidence about his own character. 163 The 2003 CJA does
not have such a limitation under gateway (b), and it is likely that most of
the evidence presented through this gateway concerns specific
instances." In contrast, the FRE only permits inquiry into specific
instances on cross-examination, and does not permit proving up those
specific instances by the defendant or the prosecution.165
C. Gateway (c) is Noticeably Broader than FRE 404(b)
Gateway (c) allows both the prosecution and the defendant to offer
"important explanatory evidence" which is defined as evidence without
which the trier of fact "would find it impossible or difficult properly to
understand other evidence in the case, and its value for understanding
the case as a whole is substantial." 66 As the discussion in Part One
indicates, this includes similar fact evidence and evidence of other
159. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
160. In order to effectively respond to a prosecutor's offer of bad character evidence, a
defendant would tend to provide evidence of the opposite trait-his good character in that respect.
See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's notes (noting "[in most jurisdictions today ...
an accused may introduce pertinent evidence of good character").
161. See Criminal Justice Act § 99.
162. Id.
163. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
164. Criminal Justice Act § 101(b).
165. The one exception is specific instances of convictions, which can be proven by extrinsic
evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b), 609.
166. Criminal Justice Act § 102.
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crimes.'67 Similar facts and evidence of prior bad acts are admissible
under FRE 404(b) for a non-conduct in conformity purpose, which
means to prove something other than the defendant's predisposition to
act in a particular way. 68
While gateway (c) covers much of what is included under FRE
404(b), it is actually a substantial departure from the FRE; once evi-
dence of other crimes and similar facts has been admitted as important
explanatory evidence, it can be used for whatever purpose the jury finds
relevant.16 9 In contrast, under the FRE, evidence of similar facts, crimes,
wrongs, or other acts, while admissible under FRE 404(b), is not admis-
sible to show conduct in conformity or a propensity. 170 Rather, such evi-
dence is admissible as circumstantial evidence of a propensity, using one
of the so-called "I-PIMP-O-MACK" factors.171
The federal prosecutor cannot argue that the accused committed a
crime because the accused engaged in prior wrongful acts, but instead
must limit the argument to something circumstantial like whether the
accused had knowledge or the opportunity to commit the current
charged crime because of prior bad acts. On the other hand, the Crown
prosecutor can argue propensity in addition to knowledge and
opportunity.
The only exceptions to this non-propensity requirement under the
FRE are when the accused opens the door by bringing in his own good
character evidence or the bad character of the victim under FRE 404(a),
and in the cases of sex and child molestation crimes, under FRE 413 and
FRE 414.172 Specific instances of character are admissible only under
the sex crime and child molestation exceptions. 3 Inquiries about spe-
cific instances may be made on cross-examination, but they cannot be
proven by extrinsic evidence under the FRE.'7
Is there really a practical difference in the outcome of the 2003 CJA
and the FRE provisions here? Some say that jurors in federal courts will
use the evidence for whatever purpose they think is appropriate, which is
167. See infra Part I.
168. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
169. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text at Part II.C.
170. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
171. See id.; CHRIS CHAMBERS GOODMAN, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE 30-33 (2011) ("I-PIMP-O-MACK" is a shorthand reference for the list of non-
propensity purposes in section 1101(b) of the California Evidence Code, which parallels FRE
404(b) with an additional "c" for consent in sexual assault cases.). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b)
(West 2011).
172. FED. R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a).
173. FED. R. EVID. 413, 414.
174. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
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exactly how juries in the United Kingdom are instructed.17 1 If federal
juries indeed ignore the instructions about how to use FRE 404(b) evi-
dence, then does the federal system reach the same result as the United
Kingdom under gateway (c)? Not quite: the main reason being that,
under the FRE, the prosecution cannot explain the propensity purpose in
closing argument, whereas the judge's summation under the 2003 CJA
can-and often does-remind the jurors that they can use the evidence
for both propensity and non-propensity purposes, as long as the evidence
helps them to better understand the case."' This focus on the propensity
rationale makes jurors even more likely to use the evidence for propen-
sity purposes in U.K. courts.
D. Gateway (d) Exceeds the Scope of the FRE by Disregarding the
General Rule of FRE 404 that Propensity Evidence
Generally is Prohibited
Gateway (d) permits the prosecution, not the defendant,"17 to offer
character evidence if "it is relevant to an important matter in issue
between the defendant and the prosecution.""' The definition includes
"whether the defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind
with which he is charged." 7 9 Propensity includes having committed an
offense of the same description as that which is currently charged, or in
the same category as that which is currently charged.1 0 The evidence
will be admissible unless factors such as the time elapsed since convic-
tion make it "unjust for it to apply in his case."' This gateway is not
limited to convictions, however. Evidence other than convictions, such
as allegations of prior misconduct (like prior bad acts under the FRE), is
also admissible through gateway (d). One important exception is when
the propensity does not make it more likely that the defendant commit-
ted the offense.182
As discussed in Part Two above, this gateway is a substantial
departure both from the common law and from the FRE. The FRE fol-
lows the general common law prohibition on using character evidence to
175. See Goodman, supra note 23, at 17-19; R v. Edwards, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3244, [18],
[2006] 1 W.L.R. 1524 [1526] (Eng.) (instructing the jury that "bad character under section 98 is
broadly defined. Once admitted (no matter through which gateway) it can be used for any purpose
for which it is relevant").
176. See id. See also R v. Highton, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1985, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3472 (Eng.).
177. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 103(6) (Eng.).
178. Id. § 101(1)(d).
179. Id. § 103(1)(a).
180. Id. § 103(2).
181. Id. § 103.
182. Id. § 103(l)(a).
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prove propensity or conduct in conformity on a particular occasion.' 8 3
There are several exceptions under the FRE. For instance, evidence of
propensity is admissible by the prosecution only in cases of intimate
crimes or sexual offenses and child molestation cases.' 84 Evidence
admitted under FRE 413 and FRE 414 also would fit under gateway (d).
The 2003 CJA limitation on when the propensity does not make it more
likely that the accused committed the current offense' 8 5 is satisfied by
the FRE because of the high-reported recidivism rates of those who
commit sexual assaults and child molestation.'8 6
In the federal courts, however, this evidence is admissible in the
limited class of federal cases involving sexual assault or child molesta-
tion.' As these crimes are generally state rather than federal offenses,
the impact on jurisprudence is not as substantial as it could be if such
crimes were more readily prosecuted by federal authorities. 188
In contrast, the 2003 CJA does not limit admissibility to certain
types of offenses with notable recidivism rates. Rather, the evidence is
admissible to prove conduct in conformity in any type of criminal
case.189
Gateway (d) also allows the admission of evidence addressing the
question of "whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful."' 90
The exception is where there is no suggestion that "the defendant's case
is untruthful in any respect."' 9 ' On the truthfulness issue, the federal
analog is FRE 609, which permits evidence of prior convictions to
undermine truthfulness.' 92 FRE 609, however, applies to a defendant
only when he testifies at trial, and where the prior crime is a felony or a
misdemeanor whose terms involve dishonesty or false statement.193
Other specific instances of non-convictions may be inquired into but
may not be proven with extrinsic evidence.194
183. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 455.
184. FED. R. EvID. 413(a), 414(a).
185. The courts need to further develop the parameters of this limitation on the propensity not
making the crime more likely, because in almost every case, the fact that someone has committed
a particular crime before would make a repeat more likely. Counter-examples would include
crimes committed under duress or threat, or the heat-of-passion killing of a spouse or other person.
186. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
187. FED. R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a).
188. Of course, some states have similar statutes that permit specific instance evidence in
certain types of cases, including California. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1108, 1109 (West 2011)
(domestic violence and elder and child abuse).
189. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 § 101(l)(d) (Eng.).
190. Id. § 103(1)(b).
191. Id.
192. FED. R. EVID. 609.
193. See id.
194. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
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Thus, the 2003 CJA expands the credibility purpose to include
other specific instances of lying and allows a whole range of evidence
that is excluded under the FRE. This broadening of the use of specific
instance character evidence to undermine credibility is similar to the
approach taken by California courts in the aftermath of the state consti-
tutional amendment entitled the "Truth-in-Evidence" provision, which
permits the use of such evidence in criminal trials only.195 Nevertheless,
in California courts, the defendant still must testify in order to implicate
his credibility through prior convictions.19 6 Under the 2003 CJA, this
gateway is open regardless of whether the defendant puts his credibility
at issue by becoming a witness and testifying at his trial.
E. Gateway (e) Opens Avenues Not Available Under the FRE
Co-defendants are permitted to introduce bad character evidence
about the other defendants through gateway (e), where the evidence "has
substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue
between the defendant and a co-defendant."' Evidence admitted under
this gateway must be adduced, or provided upon cross-examination, by
the co-defendant."'9
The kind of evidence that meets this definition includes evidence
about the defendant's propensity for untruthfulness, which parallels the
prosecution's abilities under gateway (d), except that under gateway (e),
it is limited to situations where the "nature or conduct" of the defen-
dant's defense undermines the defense of this co-defendant.199 The 2003
CJA does not elaborate on what types of evidence not concerning
untruthfulness may trigger this gateway, but subsequent cases have
found prior bad acts, prior convictions, and prior acts of dishonesty to be
adequate.2 00 In addition, while honesty is the only category specifically
mentioned, the definition is not exhaustive, and the Hanson and Lawson
cases20 1 explain that propensity evidence is admissible under this gate-
way as well. The main limitation is whether the prior act evidence has
"substantial probative value," which some courts say is satisfied as long
as the evidence is not minimal or insubstantial.202
In contrast, the FRE does not provide a mechanism for allowing a
co-defendant to offer bad character evidence against another defendant
195. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2).
196. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 2011).
197. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(1)(e) (Eng.).
198. See id. § 104(2).
199. Id. § 104(1).
200. See supra Part II.E.
201. See id. (describing the cases in more detail).
202. See id.
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in the case. The exceptions that allow evidence of the bad character of
the criminal defendant allow the defendant himself to offer the evidence,
or the prosecution or the "government" to offer the evidence. 203 There is
no mention or allowance for co-defendants in criminal cases.
Some might argue that the co-defendant is not precluded from
using FRE 413 or FRE 414 to offer evidence about another defendant's
prior sexual assault or child molestation. The explicit language of the
federal statute says that the evidence "may be considered for its bearing
on any matter to which it is relevant." 2 ' A defendant's prior sex crimes
would be relevant in a case where the co-defendant claims the other
defendant was the sole perpetrator, and the co-defendant would want to
present that evidence. Still, the prosecution likely would present the evi-
dence first in the prosecution case-in-chief against both parties, and thus
there would be no need for a co-defendant to do so. 205
For other situations not involving sex crimes or child molestation,
the federal co-defendant's only options for bringing in bad character evi-
dence of the defendant is the victim exception or to challenge the credi-
bility of a witness if the defendant testifies in the case. If the defendant
claims to be a victim, then the co-defendant can offer bad character evi-
dence about the defendant in his role as victim, but it is unlikely that a
defendant would also be considered a victim in the same criminal
case. 206 Thus, considering how rarely this use of the victim exception is
available to a co-defendant, evidence proffered by a co-defendant
regarding the defendant's character generally is not admissible under the
FRE.207 Conversely, a co-defendant under the 2003 CJA has freedom to
203. See FED. R. EvID. 404 (permitting the defendant to offer evidence and the "prosecution"
to respond). See also FED. R. EvID. 413(b), 414(b) (explaining the steps the "government" must
take to offer prior acts of sexual assault or child molestations as evidence). None of the statutes
provide any language referring to anyone other than the defendant, prosecution, or government.
204. FED. R. EvID. 413(a), 414(b).
205. In the United Kingdom, there are situations under which the prosecution may not present
the evidence and thus the co-defendant would want to use this gateway to do so. See R v.
Edwards, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3244, [48]-[50], [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1524 (Eng.). In Edwards, the
judge rejected the Crown's application to adduce evidence of the appellant's prior offenses,
because "there [was] no propensity here shown to such an extent that it would be relevant and, in
any event, it seem[ed] a bit unfair." Id. at [48]. Separate considerations apply to gateway (e), such
as relevance as to whether a previous offense makes it more likely that defendant 1, rather than
defendant 2, committed the act before the court. Id. at [50]. The judge decided that the previous
conviction was relevant to this fact and allowed defendant 2 to question defendant I on his bad
character. Id. In addition, evidence admitted through gateway (e) is not subject to a prejudicial
effect balancing test and therefore the court has no discretion to exclude the evidence as it does
when the prosecution offers the evidence through another gateway. Id. at [26].
206. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2). There is no mention of anyone other than the prosecution or
defendant offering evidence in response to this exception.
207. Those with a greater level of familiarity with the FRE might consider the first aggressor
non-character trigger of FRE 404(a)(2). That scenario, however, would not work to admit the
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offer this evidence that would be excluded in a federal court.
F. Gateway (f) is Substantially Broader than FRE 404 and FRE 608
Under gateway (f), the prosecution can offer evidence of the defen-
dant's bad character "to correct a false impression given by the defen-
dant."2 08 When the defendant "is responsible for the making of an
express or implied assertion which is apt to give the court or jury a false
or misleading impression about the defendant," this gateway is opened
for bad character evidence209 that has "probative value in correcting" the
false or misleading impression.2 10 This gateway can only be employed
so long as it "goes no further than is necessary to correct the false
impression." 2 1'
At first glance, it seems that gateway (f) is most analogous to what
some call the "fairness provision" of FRE 404(a)(1), which permits the
prosecution to offer bad character evidence about the defendant to rebut
any good character evidence that he offered about himself.212 In addi-
tion, gateway (f) resembles FRE 608 by permitting a rebuttal to charac-
ter evidence offered by the other side.2 13 Note that FRE 608 is the
flipside of gateway (f) because it permits the defendant to offer evidence
of his good character for truthfulness after evidence of his bad character
for truthfulness has been admitted.2 14
The most notable difference between this gateway and the FRE is
that gateway (f) addresses both implicit and explicit assertions. The FRE
does not address implicit assertions as to character, and the court cases
discussing when a character door is opened focus on explicit asser-
tions. 215 Implicit assertions can include evidence that is not character
evidence. As discussed in Part II above, a defendant's dress, employ-
ment status, and religious affiliation can trigger a gateway (f)
216
response. Although these implicit assertions of status, employment, or
religion are not character assertions, they trigger a bad character evi-
evidence here because the victim must be from a homicide case, and therefore, the victim would
be dead. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (a dead victim is not eligible to be a co-defendant).
208. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(1)(f) (Eng.).
209. Id. § 105(1)(a).
210. Id. § 105(1)(b).
211. Id. § 105(6).
212. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
213. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(f); FED. R. EVID. 608.
214. Id.
215. FRE 404 merely refers to "evidence" and does not address the difference between explicit
and implicit assertions as to character. For instance, a defendant can offer evidence that he does
not remember where he was when the crime occurred, which implicitly suggests that he was not at
the scene of the crime, and is evidence of what occurred, rather that evidence of his character.
216. See KEANE, supra note 1, at 509.
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dence response by the prosecution. In contrast, while the FRE permit a
good character response on the issue of truthfulness if the witness' char-
acter for truthfulness has been attacked by character evidence "or other-
wise," 2 17 there is no such exception for responding with the defendant's
bad character for traits other than truthfulness. 218 Gateway (f) is likely to
severely limit the defendant's presentation of any evidence at trial (par-
ticularly character evidence, but even other evidence). While the FRE
has a similar impact, it limits the defendant's use of character evidence,
not the defendant's use of non-character evidence that might create a
false impression implicitly. Gateway (f) admits a substantially wider
body of evidence than the corresponding FRE.
G. Gateway (g) Broadens the Time Frame for Opening the
Door to Character Evidence
Gateway (g) provides a way for the prosecution to attack the defen-
dant's bad character when the defendant himself makes an attack on
another person's character.219 The other person need not be a victim,
witness, or co-defendant in the case; any character attack on any other
person, such as one that has committed an offense, or "has behaved, or is
disposed to behave, in a reprehensible way" triggers this gateway.220
There is no directly analogous provision under the FRE. The clos-
est one is much narrower than gateway (g). The FRE permits the prose-
cution to offer bad character evidence of the defendant for a particular
trait when the defendant attacks the victim's same trait. 22 1 But the FRE
is not unlimited in terms of which traits can be attacked in rebuttal; only
the trait challenged can be refuted.222 In contrast, under the 2003 CJA,
the defendant's character attack on the victim's aggression, for instance,
triggers a response on the defendant's aggression, as well as on any
other relevant character trait of the defendant.223 In addition, under the
2003 CJA, a character attack on anyone-even those who are not par-
ticipants in the trial-triggers a character attack on the defendant.224
Thus, if the defendant offers that "Bertrand is a violent person who
has a short fuse and seems on the verge of beating everyone he sees" as
an explanation for why the defendant ran from Bertrand and, in doing
so, injured the victim in this case, the defendant's character for violence
217. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
218. Except the "first aggressor" condition in homicide cases. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2).
219. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(l)(g) (Eng.).
220. Id. at § 106(2)(b); see also supra Part II (defining "reprehensible").
221. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
222. Id.
223. Criminal Justice Act § 101(l)(g).
224. Id.
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and every other relevant trait could be offered by the prosecution. The
rationale seems to be that if the defendant is going to offer evidence
about someone else's bad character, the jury is entitled to know about
the defendant's character to help them decide whether or not to believe
the defendant. Nevertheless, admitting this additional evidence multi-
plies the issues and takes more time. Moreover, information regarding a
defendant's violent nature is not very helpful in deciding whether he is
telling the truth about what happened in the case. Finally, there is a risk
that the jury could simply condemn the defendant because he sounds
like a bad person, and conclude that he is not to be believed.
Evidence is admissible under the 2003 CJA if the defendant makes
an imputation about the other individual "(i) on being questioned under
caution, before charge, about the offence with which he is charged, or
(ii) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he
might be prosecuted for it."225 This gateway is triggered even if the
defendant made the attack while he was being questioned, before his
attorney appeared, and before he was even charged with the crime. This
is a significant difference from the FRE, which allows for opening the
door to character evidence only with evidence presented at trial, or based
on the criminal charges alone in the two special cases of sexual assault
and child molestation.22 6
IV. PART FOUR: EVALUATING THE MAJOR DISTINCTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
A. Four Important Distinctions Between the 2003 CJA and the FRE
The discussion in Part Three above described the major differences
between each of the 2003 CJA gateways and the corresponding FRE.
This section will explain and evaluate four of the most significant differ-
ences between the 2003 CJA and the FRE. Each difference highlights
the wider latitude prosecutors have to offer evidence of the defendant's
bad character under the 2003 CJA. The differences focus on the prosecu-
tion's ability to do the following: (1) offer evidence of the defendant's
character for untruthfulness regardless of whether the defendant testifies
at trial; (2) use evidence admitted for one purpose to prove something
else; (3) allow the defendant's pre-trial statements to open the door to
the prosecution's bad character response; and (4) provide a much
broader use of specific instance character evidence in criminal cases.
225. Criminal Justice Act § 106(1)(c).
226. See FED. R. EVID. 413, 414.
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1. TESTIMONY IS NOT NEEDED TO TRIGGER THE DEFENDANT' S
CHARACTER FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS
The first important distinction concerns whether the defendant must
testify to put his character for untruthfulness at issue. It has long been
standard procedure to admit character evidence about the untruthfulness
of those who testify at trial.227 The rationale for this long-standing rule is
that by taking the oath and testifying, the person testifying is in effect
asserting that he takes the oath seriously and is therefore telling the truth
when giving testimony.228
When a criminal defendant testifies in his own case, he is deemed
to be a witness and therefore opens the door to evidence about his char-
acter for truth-telling. That door is opened for anyone who testifies at
trial.2 29 Testifying after taking the oath is like vouching for one's own
credibility. When that witness has a reputation for lying or otherwise
being dishonest, it is important for the jury to consider that reputation
when evaluating whether to believe the witness or to disregard his
testimony.
The FRE operates in much the same way as the law in the United
Kingdom before the 2003 CJA. A criminal defendant's character for
credibility is not at issue under the FRE unless or until he testifies at
trial.230 Once he testifies at trial, he becomes a witness, and his character
for honesty or dishonesty is admissible. 231 Thus, the federal defendant
retains control over whether or not the prosecution can offer evidence
about his character for dishonesty.
The 2003 CJA recognizes that the credibility of the defendant may
be implicated even where the defendant does not testify at trial, particu-
larly when the jury must decide whether to believe a witness to the
crime.232 If various witness stories are consistent with each other, and
the defendant has a character trait of dishonesty, the jurors may properly
conclude that the defendant's version of events, as explained through his
witnesses and argued through his counsel, is not the most accurate
version.
Thus, the 2003 CJA considers a defendant's propensity for untruth-
fulness to be an important "matter at issue" between the defense and the
227. See FED. R. EVID. 608.
228. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 37 (noting that "[o]ne of the main functions
of cross-examination is to afford an opportunity to elicit answers impeaching the witness's
veracity").
229. FRE 608 applies generally to all witnesses.
230. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3).
231. Id.
232. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(l)(d) (Eng.).
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prosecution.233 As an important "matter at issue," the prosecution may
offer evidence of the defendant's bad character trait of untruthfulness
under gateway (d) in all criminal cases.234 The 2003 CJA permits the
prosecution to offer character evidence about a criminal defendant's
character for truthfulness regardless of whether the defendant appears as
a witness at trial.235
The impact of this first difference may be significant when a crimi-
nal defendant, along with his counsel, is trying to decide whether the
defendant should testify on his own behalf. The potential bad character
attack that arises from in-court testimony under the FRE may deter
many defendants from testifying in federal criminal cases. If the defen-
dant has a prior felony conviction, or even a misdemeanor with dishon-
esty or false statement as a necessary component of the crime, the
defendant is told that the conviction will be admitted into evidence if he
becomes a witness at trial. 236 For that reason, among others, many crimi-
nal defendants exercise their right not to testify in their own federal
cases. 237
While exercising this right may be a good strategic decision for
many criminal defendants, others might benefit from having the jurors
hear their testimony, and they may be better able to convince the jurors
of their innocence. The 2003 CJA takes this pressure away from the
defendant by admitting the convictions into evidence regardless of
whether the defendant testifies at trial.238 By removing the defendant's
power to control whether his convictions are admissible, the 2003 CJA
allows the defense to make a strategic decision regarding whether or not
to testify on the merits of the case without fear of prejudice from disclo-
sure of past convictions. The courts recognize that it is important that
jurors understand that a prior conviction does not mean that the defen-
dant is an untruthful person. 239 For this reason, the 2003 CJA may be
preferable to the FRE on the admissibility of prior convictions.
233. Id. § 103(l)(b).
234. See id. § 101(l)(d). The only limitation to offering character evidence for untruthfulness
is where "it is not suggested that the defendant's case is untruthful in any respect." Id. § 103(l)(b).
235. See Criminal Justice Act § 101.
236. FED. R. EvID. 608.
237. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at 65 (noting the "harsh dilemma" an
accused faces in deciding whether to remain silent or testify).
238. Criminal Justice Act § 103(l)(a) (permitting evidence of prior convictions).
239. See R v. Highton, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1985, [56], [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3472 (Eng.). The
Highton court explained that:
[T]he jury should be directed that they should not conclude that the defendant is
guilty or untruthful merely because he has convictions . . . . [T]he [R]ecorder gave
the necessary warnings in a manner which adequately brought home to the jury the
need to take proper care when deciding how much weight, if any, to place on the
appellant's previous convictions. In particular [the Recorder] dealt separately with
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The 2003 CJA, however, also permits evidence of prior bad acts
other than convictions to prove untruthfulness. 24 0 This component of the
new rules may be even more prejudicial to criminal defendants. Convic-
tions result either from a guilty plea or a unanimous decision by the trier
of fact. Thus, we understandably have more confidence in relying upon
the existence of the conviction: either the defendant admitted doing the
crime, or a jury of his peers found that he did the crime. In contrast,
prior bad acts and other wrongs relating to untruthfulness have not been
proven to any degree of certainty prior to being introduced at trial. Thus,
when the bad character evidence involves something short of a convic-
tion, like a prior bad act where no criminal charges were filed, admitting
evidence of prior bad acts other than convictions may be even more
prejudicial to the criminal defendant. For this reason, the danger of the
misuse of non-conviction character evidence under gateway (d) is more
pronounced than the potential misuse of such evidence under the FRE.
2. EVIDENCE ADMITTED FOR ONE PURPOSE CAN BE
USED FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE
The second important difference between the 2003 CJA and the
FRE concerns whether character evidence admitted for one primary pur-
pose can be used for another purpose. Under the 2003 CJA, as long as
the evidence is relevant to that secondary purpose, it can be used to
prove both the primary and secondary purposes.24' Conversely, under
the FRE, the general rule is that character evidence cannot be used to
prove something secondary to the rationale for admitting it. 242 For
instance, evidence admitted to counteract a false impression under gate-
way (f) might be primarily admitted for credibility purposes to show that
the defendant did not present the complete story; however, once the evi-
dence is admitted to undermine the defendant's credibility, the prosecu-
tion can also argue that the evidence may be used to show propensity.2 4 3
The U.K. courts have explained that whether evidence is admissible
issues of truthfulness and guilt and indicated how different convictions might be
relevant to those issues.
Id. at [59].
240. Criminal Justice Act § 103(l)(a) (permitting evidence of a propensity to commit a crime).
241. KEANE, supra note 1, at 471.
242. FED. R. Evio. 404.
243. KEANE, supra note 1, at 471. Keane explains that Lord Chief Justice Phillips provided
some general principles of interpretation in Campbell v. R, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 1472, [2007] 1
W.L.R. 2798 (Eng.). Noteworthy is Keane's assertion that "[o]nce evidence has been admitted
though a gateway it is open to the jury to attach any significance to it in any respect in which it is
relevant." Id. Keane also points out that "[iun considering the inferences to be drawn from bad
character the courts have in the past distinguished propensity to offend and credibility. This
distinction is usually unrealistic." Id. (referring to Campbell).
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through one of the gateways is a separate question from how that evi-
dence may be used once admitted.2"' Some evidence admitted through a
gateway for credibility purposes also will be relevant for propensity
purposes.245
For instance, under the 2003 CJA, prior convictions can be admit-
ted to correct a false impression, and also as substantive evidence of the
defendant's propensity to commit the type of crime charged.2 46 In con-
trast, under the FRE, evidence that is admissible through FRE 608 to
undermine the criminal defendant's character once he has testified at
trial is admissible only on the credibility issue, and cannot be used to
show propensity.24 7 The most notable illustration of this contrast is with
prior convictions. When a prior conviction is admissible under FRE 609
(i.e., when the defendant becomes a witness at trial by testifying, and the
conviction was for either a felony or a misdemeanor whose elements
require dishonesty or false statement), the only propensity argument that
the prosecutor can make under the FRE is that the defendant has the
propensity to be dishonest. 248 The prosecutor may not use the conviction
as evidence of the defendant's propensity to commit the charged
249crime.
This difference extends beyond evidence of past convictions to
other character evidence as well. For instance, as noted above, 250 the
FRE permit the prosecution to offer character evidence of the defen-
dant's dishonesty once he has opened the door by testifying and thus
244. See Highton, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1985, [1]. Highton solidified the following rule:
We therefore conclude that a distinction must be drawn between the admissibility of
evidence of bad character, which depends upon it getting through one of the
gateways, and the use to which it may be put once it is admitted. The use to which it
may be put depends upon the matters to which it is relevant rather than upon the
gateway through which it was admitted.
Id. at [10].
245. See Highton, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1985, [1]
It is true that the reasoning that leads to the admission of evidence under gateway
(d) may also determine the matters to which the evidence is relevant or primarily
relevant once admitted. That is not true, however, of all the gateways. In the case of
gateway (g), for example, admissibility depends on the defendant having made an
attack on another person's character, but once the evidence is admitted, it may,
depending on the particular facts, be relevant not only to credibility but also to
propensity to commit offences of the kind with which the defendant is charged.
Id.
246. See Criminal Justice Act § 101(1)(f); R v. Highton, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1985, [10],
[2005] 1 W.L.R. 3472 (Eng.).
247. FED. R. EvID. 608.
248. FED. R. EVID. 609.
249. Note that there is an exception in the special cases of sexual crimes and child
molestations. See FED. R. EvrD. 413, 414; supra Part I.B.
250. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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implicitly vouched for his honesty."' In a federal homicide case where
the defendant testifies on his own behalf, the prosecution can bring up
the defendant's reputation for being a liar, and can use that evidence to
make arguments about the defendant's dishonesty to the jury.25 2 The
federal prosecutor, however, is limited in closing argument to using that
evidence to prove that the accused is dishonest.253 The prosecution can-
not argue that because the criminal defendant has a reputation for being
a liar, he has a propensity to commit homicide even if he lied about the
reason he was present in order to cover up the killing. The evidence
admitted for credibility purposes cannot be used to argue propensity to
commit the underlying crime.254
This second difference has far-reaching implications when evi-
dence is admitted for a non-character purpose. Recall that prior to the
2003 CJA, evidence of similar crimes or acts was admissible despite the
general character evidence ban.2 55 Similarly, under the FRE, such evi-
dence is admissible for a non-propensity purpose-in other words, to
prove something other than conduct in conformity with that character on
a specific occasion. 2 56 These non-conduct-in-conformity purposes
include showing specialized knowledge and to provide context for a
larger plan or scheme. Under the FRE, that evidence is admitted solely
for a non-character purpose. Under the 2003 CJA, however, it appears
that evidence admissible for a non-character purpose, such as one deal-
ing with an important matter between the defense and prosecution, will
be used for character and non-character purposes alike.
By way of illustration, evidence that a person has broken into bank
vaults in the past can be used to prove that he possesses the specialized
knowledge of how to break into bank vaults. Now, under the 2003 CJA,
this evidence also may be used to prove that the person has the propen-
sity to break into bank vaults because he has previously demonstrated
that he knows how to do so. In this way, the jury will be confronted with
the propensity purpose even in situations where propensity is not the
reason for admitting the evidence. The fact that evidence admitted
through one gateway can be used for any purpose for which it is relevant
dramatically extends the use of character evidence for a propensity
purpose.
The benefits of this extension of the use of non-propensity evidence
251. FED. R. EVID. 608.
252. FED. R. EVID. 404.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text at Part I.A.
256. Id.
257. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (listing non-propensity purposes).
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are unclear at best. While the 2003 CJA may be more realistic about the
fact that many jurors use non-propensity evidence for propensity reasons
despite instructions and admonitions to the contrary, there are jurors
who take their roles seriously and who, if properly cautioned, refrain
from using non-propensity evidence for an impermissible purpose. 258 It
may be that U.K. jurors are even more likely than those in the United
States to take their oath to faithfully apply the laws and instructions
given by the judge seriously. Therefore, they may be better able to use
character evidence for one purpose and not another, if given the proper
instruction. When the instruction or caution indicates, however, that the
evidence can be used as circumstantial evidence as well as propensity
evidence, the breadth of these two options gives fuel to defense argu-
ments that convictions are based more on past behaviors rather than on
what occurred in the current case.
3. PRETRIAL STATEMENTS OPEN A GATEWAY TO BAD
CHARACTER EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
The third important distinction is that under the 2003 CJA, a defen-
dant's pretrial attacks on the character of other persons trigger the prose-
cution's ability to offer bad character evidence about the defendant at
trial,259 whereas under the FRE, trial testimony is virtually the only trig-
ger. A criminal defendant under the 2003 CJA can open the door to the
prosecution's use of character evidence before he even gets to trial
merely by making statements while in police custody. 26 0 A drunk person
could say something like, "My neighbor is the one who called you right?
He is a lying junkie drug dealer." That simple statement suggests that
the neighbor is guilty of "reprehensible" conduct26' and thus amounts to
an attack on the neighbor's character. The intoxicated person may have
just concocted the allegation about drug dealing and lying. He may not
even remember it in the morning. But that simple statement will open a
door weeks or months later when he becomes a defendant on trial and
permit the prosecution to offer evidence of his bad character.
Under the FRE, the defendant cannot open the door to character
evidence before trial (unless he is charged with a sexual assault or child
molestation crime, where the mere charge opens the door to his bad
258. See Goodman, supra note 23, at 56-57. See also Jody Armour, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionnakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 733,
743-44, 756 (1995).
259. Criminal Justice Act § 101(1)(g).
260. Criminal Justice Act § 105(2)(b)(1) (showing that a defendant can be responsible for
making a false impression if an assertion is made while he is being questioned before being
charged with the offense).
261. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (defining "reprehensible").
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character on prior specific instances of sexual assault or child abuse).262
Even at trial, the defendant's opening statements do not trigger a charac-
ter evidence response.263 Only testimony under oath that brings up char-
acter will open the door to the prosecution offering bad character
evidence in rebuttal.2 6
It seems that the FRE approach is preferable to the 2003 CJA on
this third point as well. Permitting a defendant to waive his chance to
avoid bad character evidence, before he has an attorney and before he
has even been charged with a crime, is contrary to the policy behind
evidence law: to govern the smooth operation of proof at trial.2 6 5 Some
may say that we allow other pretrial statements to be used at trial, such
as party admissions, and statements made by waiving the right to remain
silent.266 Due to the peculiar harm of bad character evidence, however,
this door should only be opened knowingly, intelligently, and after the
advice of trial counsel. Thus, the 2003 CJA goes too far in allowing
pretrial statements to trigger a response through gateway (g).
4. WIDER ADMISSIBILITY OF SPECIFIC INSTANCE EVIDENCE
Fourth, the 2003 CJA seems to have a preference for specific
instance evidence rather than reputation and opinion evidence, which are
two commonly admissible forms of character evidence under the FRE.
Most of the cases involving propensity evidence focus on specific
instances of conduct.2 6 7 Rarely does the prosecution seek to admit testi-
mony in the form of a witness' opinion about the accused, and while the
reputation of the accused is raised in some cases, it is not nearly as
common as specific instances of the defendant's past conduct. 268
It is easy to understand how specific instances are preferable to
reputation and opinion testimony. Opinions are only as good as the basis
for the opinion and the logical thought process of the person rendering
262. See supra Part I.B.
263. See United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 1981). The Green court stated
"[an opening statement, however, having no evidentiary value, cannot operate to place an issue in
controversy." Id. See also United States v. McLister, 608 F.2d 785, 790 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1957); State v. Richards, 438 S.E.2d 331, 335 (W.
Va. 1993) (stating that opening statements may not "open the door" to otherwise inadmissible
evidence).
264. See Virgin Islands v. Grant, 775 F.2d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1985). The Grant court stated that
"in addition to restricting defendant's use of conduct evidence, close adherence to the rules serves
an important correlative purpose; it guarantees that a defendant can open the door to evidence of
his bad character only if he takes specific and deliberate steps to prove his good character." Id.
265. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES:
TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 1-2 (3d ed. 1996).
266. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 34 (Eng.).
267. See supra notes 40, 48-49, 61, 78.
268. Id.
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the opinion. Reputation evidence is simply an amalgamation of many
people's expressed opinions about the defendant's character. In contrast,
specific instances are what the defendant actually has done, and thus can
be the most reliable indicator of what the defendant will do in the future,
or of what he did on the particular occasion at issue. For this reason, the
2003 CJA's privileged position for specific instance evidence to prove
conduct in conformity actually could be preferable in a system that
wishes to provide the jurors with the best assistance in ascertaining the
truth of guilt or innocence.
Some jurisdictions recognize the heightened usefulness of specific
instance evidence and have permitted wider use of the specific instance
character evidence. For instance, in California, the Evidence Code
allows the criminal defendant to offer specific instance evidence, as well
as reputation and opinion evidence, about any pertinent character trait of
the crime victim. 269 When the defendant offers character evidence about
the victim, the prosecution can respond with reputation, opinion, or spe-
cific instance evidence about the victim on that trait as well.270
In addition, when a California criminal defendant testifies at trial
and thus puts his character for honesty at issue, specific instance evi-
dence of his character for lying or truth-telling is admissible just as it is
for any witness who testifies at trial. 271 This expanded use of specific
instance character evidence on the issue of honesty and dishonesty was
not the result of legislative deliberation. Rather, the California electorate
made this decision in a voter-approved initiative that amended the state
constitution to change certain provisions of the Evidence Code in crimi-
nal cases.272 The California process for expanding specific instance evi-
dence is dramatically different from the deliberative process that lead to
the 2003 CJA.
B. Conclusions and Recommendations
The 2003 CJA provides some important contributions to the ongo-
ing dialogue on modifications and improvements that can be made to the
character evidence rules that govern criminal cases. Using prior bad act
evidence for a propensity purpose allows jurors to apply common sense
in determining what information is and is not useful to their verdicts. By
providing the jury with a broader scope of evidence to consider and
fewer restrictions on the ways in which to use and apply the evidence,
269. See CAL. EVID. CODE § I l03(a)(1) (West 2011).
270. See id. § 1103(a)(2)
271. See id. § 787.
272. See MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL RULES: A
PROBLEM APPROACH 47-48 (4th ed. 2008).
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the 2003 CJA may be preferable to the FRE in the search for truth in
criminal cases.
In addition, the way that the 2003 CJA de-couples prior conviction
evidence from the criminal defendant's decision to testify at trial pro-
vides greater latitude for defense attorneys to make better strategic deci-
sions about whether the accused should testify in his own defense. If the
prior conviction will be admissible for credibility purposes regardless,
then the defendant will not artificially silence his voice and decline to
testify simply because of his prior convictions. If this principle was
incorporated into the FRE, it is likely that more criminal defendants
would testify on their own behalf. An interesting next step would be to
perform some empirical research in the United Kingdom to see whether
a greater number of criminal defendants choose to testify under the post-
2003 CJA gateways, as compared to under the prior laws.
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, if the FRE were to follow
the 2003 CJA model thereby increasing the admissibility of specific
instance character evidence to prove a propensity to behave in a particu-
lar way, substantial constitutional violations could result. Broad consid-
eration of prior bad act specific instance character evidence for
propensity purposes would make it exceedingly difficult for the legal
system to remain faithful to the presumption of innocence. The way the
2003 CJA uses this character evidence for propensity puts a generaliza-
tion on the scales of justice, adding more weight to the guilty side of the
scale simply based upon what kind of person the defendant has been in
the past. That cannot and should not be the weight that tips the scale in
favor of conviction for a crime in the present.
United Kingdom courts may be alleviating some of these negative
ramifications of the 2003 CJA with particular "cautions" to the jury.
Judicial officers provide substantive, specifically tailored instructions on
how the jury may use character evidence and what preliminary questions
the jurors should answer before selecting particular uses of such evi-
dence.273 These cautions, when issued properly, can satisfy the concerns
addressed above. In the federal courts, however, jury instructions are
more formulaic, and thus jurors in the United States would need substan-
tially more guidance if the FRE moved in the direction of the 2003 CJA.
The most excruciating part of this gateway system is that a defen-
dant can open gateway (g) before he even gets to trial. Preliminary state-
ments to law enforcement officials that undermine the character of
another person not only can be directly used against the defendant, but
also can be used to unlock a gateway and allow the prosecution to bring
273. See R v. Edwards, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3244, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1524 [1526] (Eng.); R v.
Highton, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1985, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3472 (Eng.).
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in bad character evidence about him at trial. A person detained by law
enforcement can open this gateway to the admissibility of his bad char-
acter at trial before he is even charged with a crime, and before he
knows whether he will be going to trial.
The widespread use of character evidence for propensity purposes
and the indiscriminate use of character evidence for multiple purposes
will have an adverse effect on defendants in criminal trials. Pleading not
guilty may cause the prosecution to offer enough bad character evidence
at trial to significantly increase the likelihood of a guilty verdict. A
guilty plea, perhaps to a lesser charge, is certainly another option, and
may be the lesser of the two evils. This puts the defendant between the
Scylla of pleading guilty to a lesser charge to avoid having the jurors
hear about his other transgressions, and the Charybdis of going forward
with the trial and facing a greater risk of conviction because his prior
bad acts can be used to prove that he is the kind of person who does bad
things. Broadening the time frame for triggering a bad character evi-
dence response and expanding the scope of specific instance evidence
for propensity purposes force criminal defendants into a perilous no-
man's land prior to trial-a land not unlike the proverbial purgatory.
It may be that the 2003 CJA is the wave of the future, abolishing
the common law rules disfavoring the admissibility of bad character evi-
dence. If the FRE follow this example, however, then criminal defend-
ants in federal courts will suffer. The impacts of the 2003 CJA may not
be fully realized and understood for years to come. An important next
step is for scholars to compare outcomes and juror decision-making
rationales in jurisdictions with and without relaxed bad character evi-
dence rules.
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